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Abstract
Privacy-aware processing of personal data on the web of services re-
quires managing a number of issues arising both from the technical and
the legal domain. Several approaches have been proposed to matching
privacy requirements (on the clients side) and privacy guarantees (on
the service provider side). Still, the assurance of effective data pro-
tection (when possible) relies on substantial human effort and exposes
organizations to significant (non-)compliance risks. In this paper we
put forward the idea that a privacy certification scheme producing and
managing machine-readable artifacts in the form of privacy certificates
can play an important role towards the solution of this problem. Dig-
ital privacy certificates represent the reasons why a privacy property
holds for a service and describe the privacy measures supporting it.
Also, privacy certificates can be used to automatically select services
whose certificates match the client policies (privacy requirements).
Our proposal relies on an evolution of the conceptual model devel-
oped in the Assert4Soa project and on a certificate format specif-
ically tailored to represent privacy properties. To validate our ap-
proach, we present a worked-out instance showing how privacy prop-
erty Retention-based unlinkability can be certified for a banking finan-
cial service.
∗A revised version of this manuscript will appear in the Proceedings of the International
Conference on Secure Virtual Infrastructures (DOA Trusted Cloud ’13) to be held on 9-10
September 2013, in Graz, Austria. If you wish to refer to this work, please cite [2] instead.
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1 Introduction
The success of the Web as a platform for the provisioning of services and the
huge amount of personal information disseminated, collected, and managed
through the network comes with important concerns for the privacy of users’
data. The growing awareness of users, on one hand, and the increasing
regulatory pressure coming from governments, on the other, is imposing new
requirements and constraints on business that need to handle sensitive data
to carry out their services.
As part of the effort of ensuring compliance to the new data protection
laws and regulations, several solutions have been proposed defining different
privacy-aware languages that help users in defining which of their data can
be used, by whom, when, and for which purposes [5, 6, 7, 8, 28, 34]. These
solutions constitute an important step towards increasing the availability of
practical data protection technology, leveraging automated processing of pri-
vacy policies. To this end, by capturing the data protection requirements
as explicit policies, they do address a key facet of the problem. However,
their applicability remains limited unless the data protection guarantees of-
fered by providers are expressed similarly in a format that can be processed
automatically. Initiatives such as EuroPriSe [11] and Trust-E [33] represent
an initial move in the direction of explicitly representing the data protection
measures put in place by a service (or by a software product in general),
but they have significant limitations. Firstly, they take an all-or-nothing
approach to compliance (a product is either compliant with their certifica-
tion schema or not), which does not allow reasoning about privacy assurance
based on richer, finer-grained client requirements. Secondly, these schemes
rely on a format that, although structured, is essentially based on a natural
language description meant for human consumption, but that is not suitable
for automated processing. Finally, the evaluation process followed to assess
the correctness and adequacy of the privacy protection measures declared in
the certificates is not described in detail, which makes the evaluation itself
somewhat opaque to the client.
Unfortunately, even the adoption of such first-generation privacy certi-
fication schemes is quite an exception; most frequently, service providers
release just a text document (typically a web page in their website) describ-
ing what data they handle and what protection measures they put in place
to protect those data. Such a description, expressed in natural language, re-
quires an understanding of the data protection problem and solution spaces
that users cannot be expected to have. This means that it is extremely dif-
ficult for users to determine if the protection measures offered by a service
adequately cover their needs. Furthermore, the privacy statements associ-
ated to services are usually self-declarations by the service provider, which
are difficult (if not impossible) for the client to check.
To address these problems, we believe that i) the privacy protection
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statements should be expressed in an explicit, machine-readable format so
that the matching of privacy measures (offered by candidate services) with
the corresponding client policies (privacy requirements) can be automated;
and ii) the statements by service providers should be checked and endorsed
by a third party that users trust (e.g., a recognized certification entity). Ad-
dressing these two aspects would unlock new scenarios that are not possible
today: users could discover services based on their data protection guar-
antees, determine whether a service fulfills a particular privacy policy, and
compare similar services based on the extent to which each of them targets
a specific data protection goal.
Machine-readable certification of privacy statements serve the interests
of both clients and providers. As for clients, explicit privacy certificates mean
improved transparency. Companies (especially SMEs) may have not the ade-
quate resources to assess the “quality” of offered services, especially from the
point of view of security an privacy. The opportunity of having security and
privacy features described in a structured and machine-readable artifact, as
in a digital security an privacy certificate, can support users to make mean-
ingful comparisons, which may also be (partly) automated and supported by
tools, similarly to what is described in [1]. On the other hand, privacy certifi-
cates are an effective means for service providers to demonstrate compliance
with data protection regulations and customer requirements. Although le-
gal compliance with privacy an data protection regulations are mandatory
nowadays, organizations often struggle to deal with the large diversity of
regulation across geographies and sectors. For example, EU data protection
directives often differ from US privacy regulatory framework, not to mention
that the EU directive can be differently implemented in the 27 EU member
states or sector specific regulations (e.g., HIPAA). Privacy certifications can
provide a “stamp of approval” of a trusted, expert third-party attesting the
adherence to specific legal and privacy frameworks, ultimately supporting
the users to adopt service-based solutions that are provably compliant to
national and sector specific regulations.
Over the last three years, the Assert4Soa project [32] has investigated
ways of realizing a novel, light-weight approach to security certification of
services, according to which finer-grained security properties of applications
and services are evaluated by independent third parties and can be expressed
in machine-readable artifacts (called Asserts). Among other results, the
project defined a conceptual model and a certificate representation, which
provides a concrete structure to represent security certification artifacts.
Also, a reference architecture has been defined to support the processing
of certificates, the discovery of services based on their security properties,
and the automated matching of client requirements with services having cor-
responding certified properties.
In this paper we present an evolution of the Assert4Soa conceptual
model and certificate format that is specifically tailored to represent privacy
3
properties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the motivation of our work and a reference scenario. Section 3 presents our
certification model for privacy, and Section 4 illustrates its application using
concrete examples of certificates and focusing on privacy property retention-
based unlinkability. Section 5 discusses related work and, finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Motivating Example
We consider a scenario in which a client is searching for a privacy-aware
IFX-based1 financial service that addresses its privacy policies (e.g., any
personal information provided to the service stays confidential or is deleted
after a given period of time). This scenario involves i) a client accessing
the IFX-based financial service with a set of privacy requirements, ii) a
service provider implementing an IFX-based service exposed as a SOAP-
based service on the Web, and iii) a certification authority certifying the
privacy properties of web services.
In particular, we consider an IFX-based service implementing a Deposit
and Withdrawal service that enables clients to make deposits (operation
CreditAdd), possibly via cheque, and withdrawals (operation DebitAdd) in-
/from their bank account, using a reverse ATM. This service puts strong
requirements on security and privacy of the clients, such as, confidential-
ity of the messaging exchange, integrity of data, authenticity of the involved
parties, privacy of data in the cheques, and introduces the need of a security-
and privacy-oriented certification scheme.
In this paper, we focus on the certification of privacy property retention-
based unlinkability, meaning that the service is certified to maintain the
client’s personal data following the client’s requirements specified through
a retention-based privacy policy. Let us consider the scenario in which a
client deposit a cheque using the reverse ATM connected to our Deposit and
Withdrawal service. The reverse ATM scans the cheque and allows the client
to specify a retention period for the cheque scan when stored at the Deposit
and Withdrawal service storage.2 We note that if the retention period is
not specified a default one will be used by the service provider. The cheque
scan is sent as a parameter of the request to operation CreditAdd of the
1Interactive Financial eXchange (IFX) Standard (http://www.ifxforum.org/
standards/), a financial messaging protocol initially defined in the 1997 by financial in-
dustry and technology leaders. IFX aims to exchange data electronically to accomplish
a variety of transactions between (unknown and) distributed entities. The IFX standard
supports many financial and security functionalities, and integrates them in a service-
oriented architecture.
2The cheque scan can provide additional information of interest like the cheque transfers
and bounces, signatures, dates, which may be sensitive from a privacy point of view.
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Figure 1: p-Assert: high-level structure.
Deposit and Withdrawal service, via the SOAP with attachment standard
(http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-af/), and the retention period specified
by the client is associated as an annotation to it. Additional parameters of
operation CreditAdd (e.g., amount and identity token) are associated with
a default retention period possibly dictated by the legislation of the country
in which the reverse ATM resides.
3 Privacy-Assert
We propose the concept of digital privacy certificate for services (p-Assert).
p-Asserts are machine-readable, signed statements, bound to services, that
certify the privacy properties guaranteed by a service. As in current certifi-
cation schemes, the assessment of the property is performed by an indepen-
dent third party (e.g., a certification authority), who issues (and signs) the
p-Assert. The certification is based on an evaluation of the service char-
acteristics (e.g., using formal methods or testing), which can be represented
in the p-Assert. Differently from existing schemes (e.g., EuroPriSe [11] or
Common Criteria [21]), p-Asserts are represented as (signed) XML docu-
ments, a format suitable for automated reasoning and processing.
In the following, we present the structure and main features of p-Asserts,
which extends the digital security certificates (Assert) introduced in [10].
As in the original Assert, each p-Assert includes two main parts (see
Figure 1).
• A Core part that provides information about the certified entity (ser-
vice description), the specification of the privacy property of the cer-
tified entity, and additional contextual information such as the certifi-
cation authority, signature, and certification process.
• An Evidence part that describes the details of the evaluation performed
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by the certification authority (see Section 3.2) and supports the cer-
tification claims, such as a structured description of the test suites
executed as part of the evaluation process (see [24] for details).
• An additional part reserved for extensions, that can be used, e.g., to
cover domain-specific concerns or to provide additional information on
top of the content of the Core and/or the Evidence.
More in detail, in the core part, the service description contains the Tar-
get of Certification (TOC) describing the service being certified, and the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) describing the part of the Target of Certifica-
tion that is evaluated and the rationale for protecting the assets that are
identified. More sophisticated models can be present in the evidence sec-
tion of the p-Assert to describe the evaluation performed, e.g., Symbolic
Transition System model for the generation of test cases (see Section 3.2).
Note that, traditional security (as Common Criteria) or privacy (as Eu-
roPrise) certification schemes do not make a clear distinction between the
system that is being certified and the aspects of the system that are subject
to evaluation, limiting the description to the TOE in natural language. How-
ever, this distinction becomes more relevant whenever we want to use the
certificates in service-based systems, because services can be easily composed
of multiple, external services, and it should be clear which part is evaluated.
Similarly, to allow for machine-readability, the service description also pro-
vides a list of assets, which will be explicitly referred in the different parts
of the certificates. These assets replace the natural language description of
assets-to-be protected in today certification schemes.
The privacy property specification element, contains a multi-level de-
scription of the privacy property at different abstraction levels. We discuss
this element in detail in Section 3.1. The evaluation specific portion of the
certificate defines the representation of the details and results of the service
evaluation process needed to support the certified property, describing, for
example, the models used to generate the test cases and the tests performed
on the system. We will describe this part in Section 3.2.
The proposed structure of the p-Assert is based on the the Assert
model (which targets security properties), the main difference is in the de-
scription of the property. In the next sub-section, we will present the privacy
property specification element, we refer the reader to [10, 24], for a complete
analysis of the remaining part of the Assert.
3.1 Privacy Property
Privacy properties need to be specified at different levels of abstraction,
from more abstract concepts to fine-grained representations. The advantage
is two-fold: first, it allows end-users with different levels of expertise to un-
derstand the privacy features of the service, increasing transparency; second,
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Figure 2: PrivacyProperty: main elements.
it permits users (being machines or human beings) to search for services that
match their privacy requirements at different levels of complexity. Accord-
ingly, we propose different elements, from abstract concepts to the technical
implementation mechanisms, to describe the property, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. A privacy property for a certain asset (Assets element to the service
description) is described with a three layer structure, as in [30, 19], in terms
of Protection Goal, Protection Measures and Protection Mechanisms. All the
other elements are common with the previously introduced Assert repre-
sentation for security certificate (see [24] for details).
Regarding the most abstract layer, Privacy by Design principles [14] con-
stitute a natural starting point to express privacy principles. On the other
hand, they mix regulative and engineering criteria, making them unsuitable
for describing technical features only. Recently, in analogy with the “clas-
sical” data security protection goals of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability, three additional data protection goals (and corresponding protection
measures) have been proposed [30, 19].
Transparency means that “the collection and processing operations of
data and its use can be planned, reproduced, checked and evaluated
with reasonable efforts.” It can be supported by measures such a clear
privacy policy, breach notification, and so on.
Unlinkability ensures that personal data cannot be linked across domains
or used for a different purpose than originally intended [19]. It can
be supported by measures like: limited retention period, data erasure,
anonymization, data minimization, separation of contexts by different
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identifiers.
Intervenability is the “ability to intervene” for data subjects, operators
and supervisory data protection authorities to apply corrective mea-
sures if necessary. For example, it includes the right to rectification and
deletion of data for the data subject. It can be supported by measures
such as mechanisms for handling data subject’s correction requests,
break-the-glass policies, and the like.
These protection goals provide a high-level description of the privacy
properties, but they do not give any information how these goals can be
achieved. The p-Assert contains a list of protection measures, which are
linked to a protection goal, indicating the necessary measures to reach the
goal. For example, the unlinkability protection goal can be supported by
anonymization and data retention measures. Measures are realized by spe-
cific protection mechanisms, describing the techniques or procedures used to
realize a specific protection measure. For example, anonymization protection
measure can be implemented by specific k-anonymity algorithms, with a set
value of k.
More formally, a privacy property p is a pair (pˆ ,A), where p .pˆ is an
protection goal and p .A is a set of class attributes referring to specific char-
acteristics of the privacy function implemented by the service (i.e., detailed
description of protection measures and mechanisms). For instance, property
p=(confidentiality,{measure=encryption,algo=DES,key=112bit,ctx=in tran-
sit}) describes a privacy property whose protection goal is confidentiality in
transit, protection measure is encryption, and protection mechanism is DES
encryption algorithm with key length of 112bits.
In some cases, a partial order can be defined over privacy properties
based on attribute values, inducing a hierarchy HP of properties as a pair
(P,P ), where P is the set of properties and P the partial order. Given
two properties pi and pj , we write piP pj , if pi is weaker than pj (see [3]
for a more detailed discussion on partial ordering of security properties).
The hierarchy of privacy properties is fundamental for comparing different
services from a privacy point of view, which is one of the most prominent
functionality for a privacy-aware SOA infrastructure.
3.2 Evidence Representation in p-Assert
In this section, we describe a test-based certification scheme, that is, a pro-
cess producing evidence-based proofs that a (white- and/or black-box) test
carried out on the software has given a certain result, which in turn shows
that a given high-level security property holds for that software [16]. The
evidence in p-Assert contains test-based artifacts and details on how these
artifacts support privacy property p defined in the core part of p-Assert.
More in detail, it is divided into two main sections as follows.
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1?Signon<usr,pwd>
[(usr,pwd) 6=null]

2
!Signon<result>
[result=failure]

!Signon<result,token>
[result=ok]

3 4
?CreditAdd<amount,token,scan,rp>
[amount>0 ∧ token6=null ∧ scan 6=null]

?DebitAdd<amount,token>
[amount>0 ∧ token6=null]

5
!CreditAdd<result>

7
!DebitAdd<result>

6 8
Figure 3: WSCL-based model for deposit and withdrawal service.
Service model m: A Symbolic Transition System (STS) [18] that specifies
service behavior and interactions as a finite state automaton. It is used for
automatic generation of test cases. The service model specifies a label Model
that describes its level of detail and assumes values in: i) WSDL when
m models the Web Service Definition Language (WSDL) interface only, ii)
WSCL when m models the client-server conversation in the Web Services
Conversation Language (WSCL) document, and iii) implementation when
m models the implementation of service operations. We note that the service
model only describes those operations, called Most Important Operations
(MIOs), that are needed to certify privacy property p and to maintain the
correctness of the service model. A set of quantitative indexes vm (e.g.,
number of states) is defined to calculate a quality measure for the model
(the complete set of indexes is provided in [3]). As an example, a WSCL-
based model for the Deposit and Withdrawal service described in Section 2
is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows the WSCL conversation that allow the client to access
operations CreditAdd and DebitAdd of the service. First the client has to log
into the system. Operation Signon returns the variable result=‘ok’ with a
token in case of successful authentication, result=‘failure’ otherwise. After a
successful Signon, the client can call either operation CreditAdd or DebitAdd.
CreditAdd takes as input variables amount (the amount of money to be
deposited), scan (an optional parameter with a scan of the cheque used to
transfer money and passed as an attachment to the SOAP message of the
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request), token (an authentication token returned by operation Signon), and
rp (the retention policy attached to variable scan). DebitAdd takes as input
variables amount (the amount of money to be withdrawn) and token only.
Both operations return the result of the execution as output.
Test Evidence e : The testing artifacts proving a property for the certified
service. Test Evidence e is composed of the set of test cases executed on the
service, their category (i.e., functionality, robustness, penetration) and type
(e.g., random input, equivalence partitioning), and a set of test attributes
(e.g., the cardinality of the test set). It also specifies a set of test coverage
metrics (e.g., branch coverage, path coverage) measuring how much the test
set covers the service model, and is complete and exhaustive. More formally
e={cat(e ),type(e ),ta(e ),tc(e ),tr(e ),ve} where cat(e ) is the test category,
type(e ) is the test type and ta(e ) are the related attributes; tc(e ) are the
test cases while tr(e ) are the results of their execution. vej is the set of test
coverage metrics. The complete set of metrics is provided in [3] and can be
used to calculate an aggregated quality metric.
Test evidence can support a variety of privacy-related properties. For in-
stance a certification authority can award a privacy certificate C(p ,m,e ) to a
service s with privacy property C.p=(Confidentiality,{measure=encryption,algo=DES,
key=112,ctx=in transit}), service model C.m={WSCL,∗}, and evidence
C.e=
(Functionality,Input Partitioning.Equivalence Partitioning,{card=130},∗,∗,∗),
where C.e .card is the cardinality of the test set and ∗ means any value. Cer-
tificate C provides the evidence proving that s holds the privacy property
with the protection goal of confidentiality at communication (in transit)
level, using a 112-bit DES algorithm. In this example, evidence is produced
using a WSCL-based model and a set of 130 test cases with test category
Functionality and test type Input Partitioning.Equivalence Partitioning.
4 Certification of Retention-Based Unlinkability
In the previous section, we briefly presented an example of p-Assert certifi-
cate for Confidentiality of data in transit supported by functionality test. In
this section, we present a complete worked-out example showing how privacy
property Retention-based unlinkability can be certified. We assume that a
simplified language is available permitting to specify the retention period of
data contained in a service request.3 After the retention period expires, the
service provider must delete any reference to the data, assuring users that
their data are no longer available for access.
3This assumption is not restrictive since our solution can be easily adapted for working
with any privacy policy language supporting retention, including classic P3P [34].
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To show the process of certifying a service for property Retention-based
unlinkability, we consider the Deposit and Withdrawal service in Section 2
implementing a privacy retention mechanism similar to the one adopted by
Microsoft Exchange Server 2010, which supports the definition and enforce-
ment of retention tags and policies [27], but at filesystem level. We assume
that each request performed by a client specifies a sticky policy [5] for each
data item with the retention period. Sticky policies are data handling poli-
cies attached to the personal data they protect and regulate how personal
data will be handled at the receiving parties (i.e., data controllers and pro-
cessors). Users specify these policies to define restrictions on the retention
period of their data, thus keeping a level of control on their information also
after its release. Clearly, the retention period specified in the request by a
user must comply with the requirements for retention defined by the service
(see Section 2); if not specified a default retention period applies for the user
request.
In the following, we consider the certification of a cheque-based CreditAdd
only and assume that the retention period for a cheque scan attached to the
request in a cheque-based deposit is directly specified by the client using
the reverse ATM (see parameters scan and rp in Figure 3). We note that
a retention can be also specified for parameters amount and token, though
not discussed in our scenario.
Suppose that the service supports a retention mechanism with frequency
of control 1 second, minimum retention period 1 day, and maximum reten-
tion period 1 year. To this aim, the service implements a mechanism that
periodically checks (every 1s) the retention period of each request and deletes
all data for which the retention period is expired. In particular, the process
implemented by the retention mechanism is composed of the following steps:
1. the client sends a CreditAdd request to a service annotated with a
retention period rp for the cheque scan. The retention period is defined
in seconds and automatically transformed in a precise date and time
at the service side;
2. the service checks if the retention period complies with its requirements
(e.g., minimum retention for cheque scan). If yes, the cheque scan is
stored in the filesystem with the retention period; if not, the user
request fails;
3. the service periodically controls the cheques’ storage and flags all cheque
scan for which the retention period is expired (i.e., the date and time
in the retention policy are before the current date and time);
4. flagged cheques are deleted.
As soon as the service provider wants to certify this service for privacy
property p=(Unlinkability,{measure=retention,frequency=1s, min_retention=1d,
11
1?CreditAdd<amount,token,scan,rp>
[(amount,scan)6= null]

2
!CreditAdd<result>

3
?Test_Retention<chequeScanID,ret>
[deferment by freq]

4
!Test_Retention<result>
[now()<ret ∧ ∃ chequeScanID]

!Test_Retention<result>
[now()≥ret ∧ 6 ∃ chequeScanID]

5
::
6
Figure 4: WSCL-based Test model for Deposit and Withdrawal example.
max_retention=1y}), the certification authority (CA) verifies the correct
working of the above described retention mechanism by means of deferred
testing execution. Deferred testing execution is a largely used test execution
approach in which the executions of two consecutive test cases are deferred
by a specific temporal delay. The delay of the deferment is usually due to
the fact that the components that a test case exercises may not be ready
for inspection by the time the test runs (e.g., due to instantiation of classes
declared with deferred initialization stages). In our approach, execution de-
ferment is used to test properties, like retention, that should become true (or
false) after a given period of time. Our testing strategy relies on the model
m of the service (see Figure 4), on test category cat , and test type type to
produce the test model used for test case generation [3]. The test model
allows deferred test execution via the definition of specific timing conditions
on the STS-based service model (see Figure 4). In this specific case, to sup-
port the testing activities, the WSDL of the service is extended with a new
operation Test_Retention(chequeScanID,ret). This operation, which is used
at certification time only and then removed, provides the test code for evalu-
ating the retention mechanism. It takes the name of the file representing the
cheque scan (chequeScanID) in the service storage and the retention period
ret (date/time) derived from the retention policy rp as input, and returns
the result of the testing activity as output.
The Test_Retention operation checks the storage for cheque chequeS-
canID. The retention mechanism is correctly working and the Test_Retention
returns true if: i) the cheque is in the storage and the retention period is
not expired (while being less than one year) or is expired by less than the
12
Privacy Property: Unlinkability
Class Attributes: measure=retention, frequency=1s, min_retention=1d, max_retention=1y
TC1 =

I1 : DebitAdd(amount, token, scan, rp) ∈ valid partitions
EO1 : result = ok
PR2 : deferment by freq
I2 : Test_Retention(scan.chequeScanID, ret) with now() < ret
EO2 : result = True
TC2 =

I1 : DebitAdd(amount, token, scan, rp) ∈ valid partitions
EO1 : result = ok
PR2 : deferment by freq
I2 : Test_Retention(scan.chequeScanID, ret) with now() ≥ ret
EO2 : result = True ∧ scan.chequeScanID is not found
TC3 =

I1 : DebitAdd(amount, token, scan, rp) with amount, token, rp ∈ valid partitions ∧
∧ scan ∈ invalid partition
EO1 : result = err
PR2 : deferment by freq
I2 : Test_Retention(scan.chequeScanID, ret) with anytime
EO2 : result = True ∧ scan.chequeScanID is not found
Figure 5: Test cases for retention for Deposit and Withdrawal service.
1s (frequency with which the retention is evaluated), ii) the cheque is not in
the storage and the retention period is expired. It returns false in the other
cases.
To test the retention-based privacy property, we first remove opera-
tion Signon because it is not a MIO and thus does not contribute to the
generation of the test cases (see Figure 4). Also, for simplicity, we re-
moved operation DebitAdd and focused on the certification of CreditAdd.
As a consequence, the test model only involves operations CreditAdd and
Test_Retention. Since the retention test is a deferred testing we add de-
ferring time conditions to the STS-based test model in such a way that
the Test_Retention can be executed before the retention time is expired
(now()<ret) and after the retention time is expired (now()≥ret). The test
model in Figure 4 generates multiple calls to operation Test_Retention with
different deferment times (i.e., deferment by freq) for proving the correct-
ness of the retention mechanism implemented by the service. Our model
includes a cycle which iterates until the cheque scan is no longer stored by
the service, that is, the retention control mechanism is proved to be correctly
implemented for that specific scan. We note that operation Test_Retention
is iteratively executed according to the frequency used by the retention mech-
anism.
Some examples of test cases generated by the test model in Figure 4 are
shown in Figure 5. TC1 and TC2 belong to the functionality test category
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Privacy Property: Unlinkability
Class Attributes: measure=retention, frequency=1s, min_retention=1d, max_retention=1y
TC4 =
{
I : request = CreditAdd ∧ (1d < rp < 1y)
EO : result = ok
TC5 =
{
I : request = CreditAdd ∧ rp < 1d
EO : result = error
TC6 =
{
I : request = CreditAdd ∧ rp > 1y
EO : result = error
Figure 6: Test cases for verifying retention period boundary values.
and consider valid test types (all parameters are in their valid partitions).
In general, the test model in Figure 4 will generate a set of TC1-like test
cases, until the test time (indicated using now()) is greater or equal to the
retention time ret (in the form of date/time) derived from the user’s privacy
policy. TC3 is a robustness test case that verifies whether the cheque scan
is invalid (e.g. not correctly scanned), while the other parameters of the
CreditAdd are valid. In this case the result of CreditAdd is an error and the
cheque scan must be not saved or deleted immediately from the cheque scan
storage; the operation may be maintained in the system log with the other
parameters of the function call, depending on the legislation of the country
in which the reverse ATM resides. The execution of Test_Retention with
a wrong cheque scan must return a scan not found independently by the
precise time in which it is executed.
The certification authority can also verify the correct support for mini-
mum and maximum retention periods, using the additional test cases showed
in Figure 6.
5 Related Work
Different languages and format for machine-readable privacy policy for web
applications and services have been proposed. The XML-based P3P (Plat-
form for Privacy Preferences Project) language and APPEL (A P3P Pref-
erence Exchange Language) [34] are used for describing privacy policies and
privacy negotiations between a web site and users. The Enterprise Privacy
Authorization Language (EPAL) [22] is based on the same concepts of the
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [28], but it imple-
ments more privacy-specific conditions, such as purpose-based access control.
More recently, the PrimeLife Privacy Language (PPL) [4] was defined as an
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extension of the XACML authorization language. PPL allows to handle
complex privacy policies, including specifying secondary usage of the data
(e.g., when an external data processor is involved) and privacy obligation
handling, relying on XACML for access control conditions.
These privacy policy languages allow for a description and processing
of privacy policies, but they do not provide the elements for specifying the
protection measures used nor for detailing the evidences supporting their
correct implementation. As mentioned in Section 4, p-Assert can rely on
policy languages for expressing the privacy conditions, and complement them
with a more granular description of the protection measures and evidences.
Another major source of related work for this paper resides in the area
of software testing. Similarly to this paper, several works (e.g., [15, 23, 35])
focused on testing non-functional requirements of software systems. As far
as web service testing is concerned, the line of research closest to the one in
this paper considers the problem of testing a web service to assess its correct
functioning and to automatically generate test cases used in the verification
process [12, 13]. Heckel and Lohmann [20] propose a solution for testing web
services that uses Design by Contract and adds behavioral information to
the web service specifications. More recently, Bentakouk et al. [9] propose a
solution using STS-based testing and STM solver to check the conformance
of the composite service implementation with respect to its specifications
and/or client requirements. Endo and Simao [17] present a model-based
testing process for service-oriented applications. Existing approaches have
mainly focused on static or dynamic testing, while they have not focused on
certification. More in detail, these approaches test services with the scope of
verifying their security mechanisms (i.e., policy enforcement) ex-post. The
p-Assert approach elaborates on the approach presented in [3] and concen-
trates on container-level certification, which implies security policy testing
and certification. In [31], a security testing method for stateful Web Services
is proposed. It defines specific (i.e., for each security property to be tested)
security rules, eventually derived from policy, using Nomad language with the
scope of generating test cases. This rule set allows to test different properties
such as availability, authorization, and authentication by means of malicious
requests based on random parameters, or on SQL and XML injections. The
rules are applied to the operation set (obtained from service specifications
like WSDL) of the service under test, to generate test requirements (modeled
as STSs), which are then synchronized with the specifications to produce the
test set. The goal is to perform a black-box testing of web services exploit-
ing a rule-based approach for the generation of an ad hoc test set. The test
set is aimed at discovering if the service under test violates or not the secu-
rity rules. Other approaches focusing on general testing or on authentication
and authorization policies, construct abstract test cases directly from models
describing policies [25, 26, 29]. Le Traon et al. [25] proposed test genera-
tion techniques to cover security rules modeled with OrBAC. They identified
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rules from the policy specification and generated abstract test cases to vali-
date some of them via mutation. In [26], the authors developed an approach
for random test generation from XACML policies. The policy is analyzed to
generate test cases by randomly selecting requests from the set of all pos-
sible requests. In [29], the authors proposed a model-driven approach for
testing security policies in Java applications. The policy is modeled with a
control language such as OrBAC and translated into XACML. In our case
we describe an approach for testing privacy-specific policies for web services
and how is it possible to generate a certification scheme for them.
6 Conclusions
We proposed a representation for digital privacy certificates (p-Assert),
which describes the outcome of a privacy certification process for web ser-
vices in a machine-readable format. These structured and machine-readable
certificates enable the service consumer to: i) know the details about the
privacy features of the service (transparency), ii) access detailed informa-
tion on the evidence supporting the claim of the certificate (assurance) iii)
automatically reason about privacy properties (e.g., allowing service dis-
covery based on privacy requirements). Our proposal extends the security
certification framework developed in the context of the European project
Assert4Soa. Following the same approach, we described a digital privacy
certificated supported by a model-based testing process, which allows to au-
tomatically produce evidence that a given privacy property holds for the
service. The corresponding machine-readable certificate contains the certi-
fied property, the model of the service used for the automatic generation
of the test cases, and the evidence produced by their execution. We also
provided a worked-out example of the application of our scheme to the certi-
fication of privacy property retention-based unlinkability. In this context, we
introduced the concept of deferred testing as a testing activity that specifies
the time intervals between consecutive test cases. Our example focused on
offline deferred testing, meaning that the test cases on retention policies are
executed in an accredited Lab in the framework of a certification process
and the retention periods are randomly generated to maximize the cover-
age of their domain. We note however that our solution can support online
deferred testing, verifying the correctness of the retention mechanism im-
plemented by the service on real client requests and client-defined retention
periods. We plan to further analyze this post-deployment testing scenario
in our future work. Our future work will also evaluate the efficiency of our
approach, analyzing the overhead required for automatic test generation at
the increasing of policy complexity.
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